The number of patent applications and "bad" patents issued has been rising rapidly in recent years. Based on this trend, we study the overload problem within the Patent Oce and its consequences on the rms' R&D incentives. We assume that the examination process of patent applications is imperfect, and that its quality is poorer under congestion. Depending on policy instruments such as submission fees and the toughness of the non-obviousness requirement, the system may result in a high-R&D equilibrium, in which rms self-select in their patent applications, or in an equilibrium with low R&D, opportunistic patent applications and the issuance of bad patents. Multiple equilibria often coexist, which deeply undermines the eectiveness of policy instruments. We investigate the robustness of our conclusions as to how the value of patent protection is formalized, taking into consideration the introduction of a penalty system for rejected patent applications, as well as the role of commitment to a given IP protection policy.
2 The number of litigated patents is rising faster than patent grants, and half of the patents contested in court are invalidated.
3 As a result, there is now a widespread perception that patent quality has been undermined, as some critics accuse the USPTO of issuing low-quality patents that violate the patentability criteria of novelty and non-obviousness, such as Amazon.com's checkout cart for online shopping.
4
Chief among the underlying causes behind a lower patent quality is the creation of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) by Congress in 1982. Through a series of decisions, the CAFC has expanded the scope of patentable subject matter to include business methods, software, and some biotechnology products and processes. 6 With patent application ling rates projected to increase by 8% annually, this trend is unlikely to change in the near future.
7 As a result, the Patent Oce is now experiencing workload pressures: the number of applications per examiner ratio increased about 25% in the last ve years and the time the examiner spends on each application is shorter (Lemley and Shapiro, 2005). 8 In this paper, we study the overload problem of the Patent Oce and its impact on rms' R&D incentives.
1 Source: U.S. Chamber of Commerce's recommendations for U.S. Patent and Trademark Oce, http : //www.theglobalipcenter.com/images/gipc_images/pdf s/usptopatentproject.pdf
For an invention to be patentable in the U.S., four requirements must be met: statutory, usefulness, novelty and non-obviousness.
9 In order to assess novelty and non-obviousness, an examiner of the Patent Oce conducts a search of prior art, reviewing patents and non-patent literature (i.e. what has been used or described before). If he nds all the features of the invention in a single prior art reference, he rejects the application for not meeting the novelty requirement. If not, he goes on to verify that the invention is not obvious in view of the prior art, i.e. that it is "suciently dierent" from the prior art (as worded by the USPTO), above a minimum standard of inventiveness.
10 Therefore, if invalidating prior art exists but has not been found by the examiner, the patent is granted by mistake. Missing invalidating prior art turns out to be the main source of mistakes for examiners: according to Allison and Lemley (1998) and Cockburn and al. (2002) , most patent invalidations are issued on the basis of obviousness or lack of novelty.
11 This is more likely to happen as examiners lack the time to review thoroughly all the relevant prior art for each application, especially in recent patentable areas such as software and business methods where most prior art is unpatented (and thus harder to nd). We introduce a model in which rms invest in risky R&D activity resulting in inventions of dierent qualities, which are their private information. Firms can seek protection for their projects by applying for a patent. The Patent Oce then processes their claims, but examiners may not nd out all the relevant prior art for a given patent application as they assess its degree of novelty or non-obviousness. The imperfect observability of these characteristics can lead to mistakenly granted patents. Such mistakes make it easier to obtain a patent, so more people le a patent application, therefore placing a heavier burden on the examiners, which further deteriorates the quality of examination. We formalize this overload or congestion phenomenon and analyze these strategic complementarities between the application strategies and the examination process.
9 In the U.S. code on Patents (35 U.S.C.), Usefulness is described in section 101, novelty in section 102 and non-obviousness in section 103. In Europe, the equivalent requirements are statutory subject matter, industrial application, novelty and inventive step. 10 Hunt (1999) denes a non-obvious invention as "a nontrivial extension of what is already known". In his paper, discoveries are improvements to the quality of products, and the standard of non-obviousness sets the minimum extent of improvement which can result in a patent. Anything below the standard goes into the public domain. For an extensive survey of the economic analysis of the non-obviousness requirement, see Denicolo (2008) .
11 Cockburn and al. (2002) study 182 cases, half of which ended up in an invalidation by the CAFC, 37% of which on the basis of novelty (Section 102) and 47% for obviousness (Section 103). Allison and Lemley (1998) nd that "sections 102 and 103 account for 138 out of 191 total determinations of invalidity".
We characterize equilibrium R&D and patent application strategies depending on the values of two policy instruments: submission fees, and the strength of the non-obviousness requirement.
Within some range of values, the IP protection system is very eective, as it leads to a unique high-R&D equilibrium in which rms self-select in their decision to apply, and the imperfection of the examination process is therefore inconsequential. Outside of that range, however, the IP protection system is less eective: we show there exists an equilibrium in which some patents, that we call bad patents, are issued, although they would not have been issued under a perfect examination process. In some case, the equilibrium may be unique and characterized by low R&D. In some other cases, there may be multiple equilibria in the number and the quality of patent applications, some unattractive equilibria being characterized by low R&D and yet many patent applications and the issuance of bad patents, and some other, more eective equilibria characterized by high R&D and only good patents issued. The unattractive equilibrium cannot be dismissed easily as it is preferred ex ante by rms. Moreover, the design of policy instruments to stimulate R&D would inevitably lead to a range of parameters where multiplicity of equilibria is prevalent. These results illustrate a weakening of standard control instruments when Patent Oces face serious congestion problems. Marginal changes in these instruments cannot solve the equilibrium selection problem faced by the Oce and they have a limited impact on rms' strategies. In equilibrium, the Oce must tolerate unwarranted patent applications and bad patents as a necessary evil.
We extend our basic setting in several directions and prove that our conclusions are byand-large robust, in particular with respect to how the value of patent protection is formalized.
We also consider the possibility of enlarging the set of instruments and introduce a penalty for rejected patent applications: such a penalty unambiguously improves the situation, although the characterization of equilibria remains similar in nature. Finally, we prove that the Patent Oce's commitment power on the IP protection policy, in particular on the toughness of the non-obviousness criterion, is critical and we show that in the absence of such commitment, R&D incentives vanish entirely.
The theoretical economic literature on patents has paid little attention to the patent Oce, and its examination process has not yet been formalized. Two exceptions are Langinier and Marcoul (2003) and Atal and Bar (2008) , who address the issue of prior art search and disclosure by innovators. Langinier and Marcoul study agency problems that can arise between an examiner and an inventor: moral hazard on the inventor's search of prior art and adverse selection on whatever information he chooses to disclose in the application. Atal and Bar (2008) focus on innovators' incentives to search for prior art, before undertaking R&D and before applying for a patent. By contrast, we do not consider incentives to search for prior art (for the examiner); we elaborate on an idea outlined in Caillaud (2003) and Hall (2009) , focusing on the impact of the Oce on rms' incentives to innovate and to apply for patent protection. Our paper is close to Chiou (2008) , who investigates the substitutability between the Patent Oce examination eort and the eort made by other actors in the industry, to assess the quality and novelty of a patent application.
Many contributions in the literature analyze the impact of submission fees or of patentability standards on the innovation process.
12 A few papers focus on the optimal design of these instruments by a Patent Oce. Lemley (2001) argues that it is ecient to implement a low examination standard, because the costs of improving the examination process and the quality of issued patents would outweigh the cost of the mistakes currently made (the Patent Oce is "rationally ignorant"). Cornelli and Schankerman (1999) and Scotchmer (1999) study the design of renewal application fees and their impact on R&D. In those articles, patent life is endogenously chosen by rms via the renewal application fee. Scotchmer (1999) considers a model of asymmetric information where the Patent Oce cannot observe the costs and benets of rms' innovations. She shows that the only feasible incentive mechanisms are equivalent to patent renewal systems (where rms must pay back money to the Patent Oce to extend their patents). Cornelli and Schankerman (1999) show that it can be welfare-improving to dierentiate patent lives when rms have dierent R&D productivity, which is unobservable by the Patent Oce.
By contrast, we argue that these instruments may be of limited use to improve the performances of the IP protection system. Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 characterizes the dierent equilibria. In Section 4 we discuss the issue of multiplicity and we derive the comparative statics of the dierent equilibria, including the impact of submission fees and the 12 See e.g. O'Donoghue (1998), Hunt (1999 and , and for a general view, Scotchmer (2004) , on the impact of patentability requirements on the R&D process. non-obviousness standard; nally, we introduce new possible instruments, such as a penalty in case of patent denial. In Section 5 we study and discuss various extensions of the model, while Section 6 concludes.
Model
We consider an industry consisting of a continuum of rms of mass 1.
13 Firms invest in risky R&D activities that generate more or less innovative new technologies or products that we call projects. They can seek protection for their projects by applying for a patent to the Patent Oce. The Patent Oce processes claims and grants or denies protection, based on the results of an examination process. R&D activities are formalized in a rather standard way and we focus on the nature and imperfections of the examination process to investigate its impact on the pace of technical progress within the industry.
Each rm chooses an R&D eort level π in [0, 1) at cost γ(π). The R&D outcome is a project characterized by its innovativeness θ, θ ∈ [0, 1). θ = 0 stands for a non-novel project that is already part of the existing prior art; a larger θ in (0, 1) refers to a project that is more innovative and farther from the frontier of existing prior art. R&D eort π determines the stochastic distribution of the project innovativeness, and a higher eort generates stochastically higher innovativeness (according to rst-order stochastic dominance). We assume a specic distribution for θ to capture these elements: with probability 1 − π, θ = 0 and with probability π, θ is drawn from the uniform distribution on [0, π] . So, the c.d.f. equals 1 − π at θ = 0 and
A rm can either seek protection of a patent for its project, or forgo institutional protection.
We assume the project has value v under patent protection and 0 otherwise. v should be interpreted as the dierence between the discounted expected prots from the project when it is protected by a patent and the discounted expected prots of the best alternative strategy for the rm. Depending on the industry, this strategy can take several forms: e.g. letting the innovation 13 It is not clear whether the market for patent applications is concentrated or not: two dozen rms account for one fth of all patents granted by the USPTO (Source: USPTO website and IFI Patent Intelligence 2008 report, see http://www.iclaims.com/IFIPatents010909.htm). However, what matters is whether rms take into account the impact of their applications on the Oce's congestion or, as we assume here, if they are "congestion-takers". It seems that even a large innovative company does not decide upon its IP protection strategy on the basis of how much congestion it will induce at the Patent Oce.
fall into the public domain and secure short-term monopoly prots before imitation, or keeping the innovation secret and getting the associated monopoly rent as long as there has not been informational leakage or imitation. v may therefore be large for product innovations that cannot be kept secret and can be easily duplicated, while it may be small when secrecy is an eective mode of protection. The normalization of non-protected prots to 0 has the consequence that rms would engage in 0-R&D in the absence of any patent protection; given the previous interpretation, π = 0 should not be interpreted literally as no R&D but rather as the natural level of R&D that prevails in the industry in the absence of an institutional IP protection system.
That the value of a patent does not depend on the project innovativeness is admittedly a restrictive assumption. We relax it in an extension and show that our analysis is qualitatively robust. Another restriction is that the value of a patent does not depend on the number of patents granted. Hence, we rule out market interactions among potential innovations and market structure issues, assuming basically that projects can be marketed independently on isolated markets. We relax this assumption as well and show how this introduces a force counter-acting the congestion phenomena.
A rm applying for a patent has to pay an application fee f ≥ 0. We focus on two standards of patentability: novelty and non-obviousness, and we formalize the patent examination process as follows. Investigating novelty and non-obviousness mostly relies on the examiners searching for existing prior art (existing patents, non-patented literature such as publications and nonprotected inventions that already cover the claims contained in the application).
14 The search of prior art yields the examiner an imperfect signal σ, whose stochastic distribution depends on the true innovativeness as well as on the eciency of the examination process. It can be viewed as an assessment of the frontier of knowledge in the eld and we assume that the major source of imperfection rests on the risk of not identifying a recent or more advanced step in the technology, i.e. of not nding all relevant prior art, so that the innovativeness of a project can only be over-estimated by examiners.
To formalize these elements, we assume that σ is distributed on {θ, 1} with Pr{σ = θ} = 14 Note that in a dynamic setting, an increase in the number of patents makes the future search of examiners easier since the prior art will mostly be patented. For example, searching prior art and determining novelty on software patent applications becomes easier now that more software is patented than in the early 1980's when most of the prior art was not patented.
The eciency of the examination process is aected by congestion, which is captured by supposing h = h(n), where h(.) is increasing within [0, 1] : the larger the number of applications, the more dicult for an examiner to study the eld of each application, the less likely he is to nd all the relevant prior art. >From this formalization, it follows immediately that σ = 0 means that an identical invention already exists in the prior art, so the application does not pass the novelty test. If σ > 0, the application passes the novelty test. Then two situations can arise, depending on a non-obviousness requirement σ * > 0 that characterizes the mandate of the Patent Oce: the application passes the non-obviousness test (and therefore is patented) if and only if σ ≥ σ * . It follows that the probability of obtaining a patent for a project θ is equal to 1 if θ ≥ σ * and to h if θ < σ * .
We take the non-obviousness standard σ * and the submission fee f as given: the Patent Oce is an agent for the Congress, or a regulation authority or more generally for a social planner, and these policy instruments are xed and well established, perhaps as a result of an optimal design, of congressional decisions, of legal judgements or of the reputation of the Oce. Firms simultaneously engage in R&D programs, develop projects and choose to apply for a patent or not. Then, the Patent Oce evaluates all applications and grants or denies patent protection, depending on the outcome of the examination process. We therefore adopt a positive view of the IP protection system and characterize the equilibrium in terms of R&D and patent applications in a given institutional framework.
To address the normative question of the optimal design of the IP protection system, in particular of these instruments (f, σ * ), we should consider explicit social objectives that incorporate the social welfare value of innovations, the cost of R&D and the deadweight losses associated with the monopoly positions created by patents, and we should then determine the system that maximizes these objectives ex ante. The analysis would be immediate if the examination technology is perfect (i.e. if h(n) = 0 for all n). But with an imperfect examination technology, we will argue that equilibrium multiplicity becomes a major issue for most values of (f, σ * ), thereby preventing a meaningful analysis of the issue of the optimal design of the IP protection system. Therefore, we content ourselves with a positive analysis; we will simply refer to one normative aspect: reducing the number of patents in equilibrium, while maintaining R&D constant, is socially benecial as it reduces the overall deadweight loss.
15
The subjectivity and the lack of measurability of the non-obviousness standard might make it dicult for the Patent Oce to commit to a rigorous examination (see Kahin (2001) ).
16
Moreover, in a dynamic perspective, the policy of IP protection may evolve over time. So, as an extension, we investigate another polar case in which σ * is determined ex post, once R&D has already been done and rms' applications have been submitted.
A related remark is that the Patent Oce is not a sophisticated player; in fact, it is not even strategic in most of the analysis except in the extension in which σ * is determined ex post.
In real life, Patent Oces receive new applications and take new decisions every year. They can rely on other various instruments that could be changed over time, such as the number of examiners employed, or the backlog of unexamined applications (which may signal a high quality examination, where examiners spend more time on each application). Our simple model, assuming either full commitment to an exogenous examination process or assuming a simple second-mover situation in which σ * is determined ex post, is a rst preliminary step in analyzing the role of the Patent Oce, before developing a fully dynamic analysis in which the issue of dening the Patent Oce's objective function should be addressed.
Finally, we make the following assumption:
This leads to the following technical lemma, whose proof is immediate, hence omitted. Lemma 1. Let A σ (.) be dened for x ∈ [0, +∞) by:
it has a unique minimum attained at γ (σ) and, for σ > 0, the equation A σ (x) = 0 has a unique positive root a(σ) and a(σ) increases in σ.
15 Note that in a dynamic setting, it could be argued that patents have also a benecial impact per se as they speed up the diusion of knowledge in the economy. 16 Moreover, to analyze a repeated game we would have to introduce a litigation stage and the possibility of patent invalidation after issuance, or an opposition procedure like in the European Patent Oce. This goes beyond the scope of the paper. It turns out that in the following analysis, a(σ * ) is the appropriate way to measure how tough the non-obviousness standard σ * is.
Equilibrium analysis
In this section, we provide the complete equilibrium analysis in our setting.
17 In each case, we posit an equilibrium R&D eort π * and the set of values of θ for which rms apply for patent protection in equilibrium. We nd necessary conditions for this application strategy to be a best response for rms. We then deduce the optimal application decision of a rm that deviates by investing π = π * in R&D and compute the expected prots from such a deviation.
These expected prots have potentially two local extrema, one at 0 and one within (σ * , 1); the detailed analysis, relegated in the appendix, consists in comparing these two extrema. This gives us necessary conditions for the posited strategies to actually sustain an equilibrium, these conditions being sucient in all cases.
Given the nature of the examination process, it is immediate that a project θ, with θ ≥ σ * , applies for a patent if and only if v ≥ f , while a project θ, with θ < σ * , applies if and only if h(n)v ≥ f , where n is the expected number of applications. The following lemma is then immediate.
Lemma 2. In any equilibrium, if a rm of type θ < σ * applies with positive probability, then all rms with θ > σ * apply with probability 1; and if a rm of type θ > σ * does not apply, no rm with θ < σ * applies with positive probability.
This lemma rules out equilibria where the Patent Oce only receives applications from the most obvious projects.
18 It shows that, besides π * , equilibria can be characterized by m * + and m * − , the masses of applications for patent coming from projects with θ ∈ (σ * , π * ] and with
The imperfect examination technology will lead to patents being granted to projects that would not be patented under perfect examination, i.e. to projects such 17 More precisely, we provide the analysis for equilibria under pure strategies with respect to the choice of R&D eort. In the basic setting this is without loss of generality for almost all values of the parameters of the model (see footnote 21 below). 18 We do not consider dynamic issues where the backlog of pending applications could discourage the best innovators to apply. Instead, we focus on situations where the patent system still serves its initial purpose of attracting the best innovators.
19 When π * < σ * , m * + = 0 and only m * − matters.
that θ < σ * ; for this reason, we will call these bad patents, although ex post all patents are costly in the economy because of the monopoly deadweight loss they create.
For ease of presentation, we distinguish cases according to the level of equilibrium R&D:
high-R&D equilibria, and low-R&D equilibria or no-R&D equilibria, depending on whether the equilibrium R&D eort is above σ * or within [0, σ * ].
High-R&D equilibria
We explore rst the existence of a high-R&D equilibrium, i.e. with positive R&D such that σ * < π * . There must exist some rms applying for patent protection otherwise R&D would just be a pure waste. So, necessarily v ≥ f and at least highly-innovative projects with θ > σ * apply for protection, hence m * + > 0. Lemma 2 implies that:
Suppose that m * − = 0 and 0 < m * + < π * − σ * . Since rms θ > σ * face the same problem ex post and do not all apply, they must be indierent so that necessarily: v = f . But then, the expected prot function is simply equal to the cost −γ(π), hence decreasing. Such an equilibrium with π * > σ * cannot exist. Therefore, m * + = π * − σ * , i.e. in any high-R&D equilibrium, all projects with θ ≥ σ * apply for patent protection. Let us call separating, an equilibrium with m * − = 0, i.e. in which projects with θ < σ * refrain from applying for patent protection, pooling, an equilibrium with m * − = 1+σ * −π * , i.e. in which all projects apply, and mixed, an equilibrium with 0 < m * − < 1 + σ * − π * , i.e. in which some projects with θ < σ * apply. We obtain the following characterization:
• there exists a high-R&D separating equilibrium if and only if f + a(σ * ) ≤ v and
then, π * = φ(v − f ) and φ(v − f ) − σ * patents are issued;
• there exists a high-R&D mixed equilibrium if and only if f + a(σ * ) ≤ v, f ≤ h(1)v and (1) holds as a strict inequality; then,
of rms with θ < σ * applies for protection and
• there exists a high-R&D pooling equilibrium if and only if a(σ * ) ≤ v(1−h(1)) and f ≤ h(1)v;
It is immediate to write the key condition (1) in the following more intuitive way:
High-R&D separating equilibria are of particular interest: they are characterized by signicant R&D activity and they exhibit self-screening in the application process as only non-obvious projects apply for patent protection. Therefore, only good patents are issued, i.e. patents that would be granted under a perfect examination technology.
20
In our model, a marginal increase in R&D investment stochastically increases the innovativeness of the project, which is valuable only to the extent that it increases the probability of obtaining a patent, i.e. only to the extent that it increases the probability of non-obvious projects θ > σ * . Therefore, R&D investment below σ * is useless; only at high level of R&D, hence for high R&D marginal cost γ (π), does a marginal increase in R&D generate a positive marginal prot, equal to v − f the net value of a patent. A high application fee reduces the marginal value of a patent and therefore reduces or even annihilates incentives to R&D. Similarly, a tough nonobviousness standard implies that rms have to invest high levels of R&D to make a dierence, which might be too costly. This is why separating equilibria exist only if f + a(σ * ) ≤ v, i.e. if the application fee and the non-obviousness standard are low enough.
The other condition for the existence of separating equilibria (f ≥ F (σ * , v)) guarantees that the number of non-obvious projects applying for patent protection is not too high, so that the Patent Oce is eective enough in identifying poorly innovative projects, thereby deterring applications by obvious innovations. This is the case when the application fee or the nonobviousness standard are high enough (as F (., , v) is decreasing), as it limits the number of non-
of parameter values for which separating equilibria exist; Figure 1 illustrates our discussion.
20 Remember that we take σ * as given here and do not address the question of whether the non-obviousness standard is too tough or too permissive. High-R&D pooling equilibria are also characterized by a signicant R&D activity, but the process of granting patents cannot rely on self-screening and only rests on the imperfect examination. So, some obvious projects obtain unwarranted patent protection that is, they would not be patented given the standard σ * if the examination technology were perfect. A marginal increase in R&D induces a shift in the probability of getting a patent from h(1) for obvious projects to 1 for non-obvious ones. In equilibrium, marginal benet equals marginal cost of R&D: (1)), provided the non-obviousness standard is low enough for such an eort to be more protable than simply not investing at all in R&D. Moreover, the application fee has to be small as well, so that applying for protection is attractive even for obvious projects. Therefore,
of low application fees and low non-obviousness standard (see Figure 1) .
Finally, the proposition proves that within a subset of D S , there also exists equilibria in which some obvious innovations ask for patent protection. This multiplicity is not surprising as the game of application for patent protection exhibits strategic complementarities, as is usual for congestion models: when more rms apply, the congestion problem becomes more severe, it becomes more likely for an obvious project to get patented, which translates into more numerous applications for obvious projects. Note that the mixed equilibrium is unstable in the following sense: if a mass m < m * − of rms apply for protection, h(φ(v − f ) − σ * + m)v < f so that all obvious projects would strictly prefer not to ask for protection, while if m > m * − , all obvious projects would be strictly prefer to ask for protection. Hence, we omit the mixed equilibrium in our later discussion.
21
3.2 Low-R&D and no-R&D equilibria
It is quite immediate to analyze low-R&D equilibria, i.e. equilibria with positive equilibrium R&D such that 0 < π * ≤ σ * . The intuition provided in the previous subsection shows that a low R&D activity generates obvious projects so that a marginal increase in R&D in this range has no value. This clearly suggests that zero R&D is preferred to low R&D. This is formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. There cannot exist equilibria with low R&D, i.e. such that π * ∈ (0, σ * ].
So we focus on no-R&D equilibria, π * = 0, for which a mass m * − ∈ [0, 1] of rms applies for protection in equilibrium. Unsurprisingly, the set of no-R&D equilibria exhibits the same kind of multiplicity due to strategic complementarity as in the previous subsection.
Proposition 3. If f > v, there exists a no-R&D equilibrium in which no rm applies for patent
• there exists a no-R&D equilibrium in which all rms apply for patent if and only if h(1)v ≥ f and a(σ * ) ≥ v(1 − h(1)); then, h(1) rms obtain protection;
• there exists a no-R&D equilibrium in which no rm applies for protection if and only if
21 For completeness, it can be shown that:
which is a zero-measure set, there exist mixed-strategy equilibria in which rms randomize between π = φ(v −f ) and π = 0 and ask for patent protection according to a separating or a mixed equilibrium in the application sub-game.
• Within DP , there exist mixed-strategy equilibria in which rms randomize between π = φ(a(σ * )) (with probability
) and π = 0 and ask all for patent protection; these equilibria are similar to the pooling equilibria described in the text.
We omit these equilibria from our discussion, but see Proposition 5 in subsection 5.2.
• there exists a no-R&D equilibrium in which some but not all rms apply for patent if and 
This proposition characterizes all cases in which the IP protection system is ineective, i.e.
does not stimulate R&D at all.
22
The intuition is similar to that of the previous subsection. First, if the application fee is so high that a patent has negative net value (f > v), then no rm asks for patent protection and there is no incentives to R&D at all. Second, the system may still be ineective even when the application fee is moderate (f < v): if the standard of non-obviousness σ * is high enough, the probability that a rm comes up with a non-obvious project is too low so that rms prefer not to invest in R&D. Within this domain, there are multiple equilibria in terms of application strategies, depending on whether f is indeed low or not: if f is low, rms can count on congestion in the examination process to obtain a patent, even though they have obvious applications. Note again that equilibria with randomization are unstable and we omit them in our discussion.
Equilibria without any patent application reect a situation where the IP protection system plays no role, neither positive nor negative, and could be removed. No-R&D equilibria in which all rms apply for patent protection are however clearly quite unattractive: in such an equilibrium with congestion of the Patent Oce, the IP protection system does not stimulate R&D at all and some patents are granted whereas no project would pass the novelty test if the examination technology was perfect.
Finally, the corollary indicates that if congestion is a major impediment to the examination process so that h(1) is close to 1, then there are only very specic values of the instruments of IP protection (f, σ * ) that guarantee that R&D is positive in any equilibrium, i.e. that the IP protection system serves its purpose. In other words, when congestion is a major problem, a no-R&D equilibrium is likely to exist and the IP protection system may then be quite ineective.
22 See again Figure 1. 4 Equilibrium properties
Multiplicity and comparative statics
In this subsection, we discuss the issue of multiplicity and compare the properties of the various equilibria that can emerge. As a preliminary remark, we summarize in Corollary 2 the properties of R&D eorts in high-R&D equilibria.
Corollary 2. The R&D eort in the pooling equilibrium increases as v increases, but does not depend on f and σ * . The R&D eort in the separating (and mixed) equilibrium is an increasing function of v, a decreasing function of f , and does not depend on σ * .
In the separating equilibrium, the submission fee f is spent only for non-obvious projects and therefore discourages R&D. In the pooling equilibrium, however, f is spent for all types of projects; it acts as a xed cost and so, has no impact on R&D.
23 The impact of v on R&D eorts is straightforward. Finally, the non-obviousness requirement has no impact on R&D eorts:
in the pooling equilibrium all rms apply for a patent, whether their application is below or above the requirement, and in the separating equilibrium the requirement does not aect the rms' marginal benet of investing in R&D. Therefore, the threshold σ * determines equilibrium submission strategies but has no direct impact on R&D incentives.
The separating equilibrium exists within the domain
is moreover the unique equilibrium. In this case, the IP protection system works perfectly, although the examination technology is noisy, because rms self-select in their application strategies and invest in intense R&D programs. Note that when congestion is a serious problem, i.e. when h(1) is close to 1, D * S shrinks: multiplicity is most likely and with it, the presence of no-R&D equilibria. When multiple equilibria exist, there is a pooling equilibrium with some or no R&D activity and a high volume of applications, and a separating equilibrium with higher R&D activity, fewer applications and more good patents. If indeed the pooling equilibrium prevails, congestion has a clear negative impact on R&D: as examiners receive too many demands, the probability to obtain a patent on a bad project increases, so incentives to innovate decrease and rms make a weaker R&D eort. Consequently, more patents are issued on obvious applications and there are fewer non-obvious patents in the industry; in the end, issuance of obvious patents slows down the pace of innovation.
The pooling equilibria are preferred ex ante by rms. Selecting among multiple equilibria is problematic and we do not want to argue necessarily that the pooling equilibrium should prevail because it is preferred by the rms. But conversely, the pooling equilibrium cannot be dismissed as being implausible and the tension between social and industry valuation should raise at least serious concerns about the functioning of the IP protection system in this range of parameter values.
Corollary 4 compares the expected volume of patents delivered in the separating equilibrium and the pooling equilibria (with low or no R&D) when multiple equilibria co-exist.
Corollary 4. Within
, the expected volume of patents delivered is lower in the separating equilibrium than in the pooling equilibrium.
Therefore, if the submission fee and / or the degree of non-obviousness requirement are high, the Patent Oce delivers more patents in the pooling equilibrium (with or with no R&D) than in the separating equilibrium (with high R&D and fewer applications). This result shows that there is not necessarily a correlation between the volume of patents granted and rms' R&D activity.
While an IP protection system within D * S works eectively, there are strong arguments suggesting that the range of multiplicity D M is also relevant. Indeed, recall that the R&D eort in the separating equilibrium is a decreasing function of f . For any normative viewpoint on how f should be designed, f should be reduced as much as possible within D * S to stimulate R&D. This would lead to xing f = h(1)v, a boundary on which another less appealing equilibrium exists, with applications by obvious projects and therefore bad patents being delivered with positive probability. In other words, the existing IP protection instruments (σ * , f ) are not sucient to solve unambiguously the trade-o between selecting only non-obvious applications and encouraging R&D.
Therefore, when the Patent Oce is subject to overload and congestion, the whole process of patent application and evaluation may go through discontinuous changes of regime and may not function properly due to a fundamental problem of strategic complementarity across rms and multiplicity of equilibria that cannot be xed by setting appropriate levels for the classical instruments of the IP protection system. Observing large swings in the number of applications or of issued patents may be due to a shift from one equilibrium to the other, and therefore not be related at all to small changes in the environment, e.g. to a change in the cost of R&D as coming from technical change.
Introducing a penalty for rejected applications
The IP protection instruments (f, σ * ) are of limited eciency to induce self-selection by nonobvious projects and to stimulate R&D. Adding other instruments could help the Patent Oce select the separating equilibrium. In our setting, fees could be contingent on the Oce's observable decision; this amounts to introducing a penalty that a rm would have to pay if its projects is proven to lack novelty or to be obvious, i.e. if the patent is rejected.
24 This is not the case for the moment, neither in the US nor in Europe or in Japan. While it has no impact on the submission strategy for non-obvious projects, this penalty can modify the submission strategy for other projects as well as the R&D eort in equilibrium.
Let us therefore incorporate in the previous model a penalty b to be paid when the Patent Oce nds out a signal σ with σ < σ * . It is immediate to see that the situation is the same as if the submission fee were equal to f + b and the value of the patent were equal to v + b. Hence, the following characterization of equilibria: Proposition 4. In the model with penalty for patent rejection, the characterization of equilibria 24 In a legal discussion paper, Thomas (2001) suggests the similar idea of a "patent bounty", that would combine a ne to the applicant of a bad patent with a reward to the third party that would prove its invalidity (the latter relates to "post grant reviews" used in the European Patent Oce.
follows that of Propositions 1-2-3 with separating equilibria with R&D eort
pooling equilibria with R&D eort π * = φ((v + b)(1 − h(1))) in
and no-R&D equilibria in
}, the separating equilibrium is the unique equilibrium. 
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In the separating equilibrium, rms only apply for non-obvious patents, so none spends the penalty; the penalty has no impact on R&D activity. In the pooling equilibrium, only rms with obvious projects may have to incur the penalty b, so an increase in b increases incentives to have a non-obvious project and therefore stimulates R&D.
Therefore the penalty would be a powerful instrument, as it would unambiguously encourage R&D: in addition to reducing the domain of no-R&D and expanding that of separating equilibria, it increases the R&D eort in the pooling equilibrium.
However, the trade-o between encouraging R&D and selecting only non-obvious applications still remains. Indeed, R&D activity is maximized with the smallest possible submission fee f that induces the separating equilibrium, or the largest possible penalty b that induces the pooling equilibrium. Reducing f or increasing b lead to the domain of multiple equilibria with positive R&D. In that domain, the R&D eort is higher in the separating equilibrium than in the pooling equilibrium, but rms' prot is higher in the latter, so the Patent Oce may still be unable to select only non-obvious applications. (1)) ) and shrinks otherwise. In a pooling equilibrium, an increase in b increases the R&D eort, as well as the number of patent grants. 
Imperfect commitment by the Patent Oce
Throughout the model we have assumed that the standard σ * is determined ex ante, so rms know it as they choose their R&D and submission strategies. However, since patent examination is done by individuals (examiners), it can be considered as a rather subjective process, and the Patent Oce may not be able to commit to a standard. In that case, the threshold for nonobviousness is determined ex post, once R&D has already been sunk and the Oce has received patent applications.
Ex post, the impact of granting patents on social welfare is unambiguously negative: the monopoly power they grant leads to a deadweight loss and is therefore socially costly. Note that the dynamic impact is ambiguous: when innovation is sequential and the rst generation is patented, it can discourage R&D by subsequent innovators, but at the same time patents imply disclosure of knowledge (relative to secrecy), which can enable subsequent innovations.
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However, in our static model we rule out dynamic considerations and interactions between innovations; so, ceteris paribus, granting patents is socially costly.
26 In addition, granting obvious patents creates a social cost of litigation when the patent is challenged in court.
Therefore, if its mandate is aligned with social welfare, the Patent Oce should reject all applications ex post, i.e. σ * = 1. Anticipating this, rms have no incentives to invest in R&D.
Therefore, the Patent Oce's ability to commit to a standard of non-obviousness σ * < 1 is critical for the incentives to innovate provided by the patent system.
Another facet of the commitment problem is related to the fact that, even if the Patent
Oce could perfectly commit to the standard σ * , examination is performed by examiners whose incentives may not be perfect. To illustrate this point, suppose an examiner in charge of n applications must exert unobservable eort e at cost ψ(e) (increasing convex) to assess the existing prior art on these applications with an outcome given by the probabilityh(n, e) of not nding prior art on an application θ < σ * . As before,h(., .) increases in n but it decreases in e. Suppose that no examination eort leads to a zero probability of nding prior art, i.e.
h(n, 0) = 1. In this moral hazard situation, a Patent Oce examiner can be rewarded only on the basis of the observable variables at the level of the Oce that is, on the basis of the number of applications and the number of those rejected because prior art has been found.
In such a setting, the IP protection system cannot be perfectly eective because there cannot exist high-R&D separating equilibria. For, suppose there exists one. Then all applications would be non-obvious and the examiner would have no incentives whatsoever to exert eort as he could not possibly reject one of the applications. Formally, condition (1) with e = 0 and h(π * − σ * , 0) = 1 would amount to v ≤ f . Equilibria in this extended framework must therefore imply bad patents (if only a high-R&D pooling equilibrium exists) or low R&D (if a no-R&D equilibrium prevails). Our emphasis on this weakness of the IP protection system is therefore reinforced in such a setting.
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5.2 The value of patent protection depends on the number of patents
In the model, we assumed that the protability of a patent does not depend on the number of patents granted in the industry, so we ruled out interactions between innovations. However it would be more realistic to assume that there is competition between innovations. One possible reason is the overlap between patents: as more patents are granted, the monopoly power of a patent holder is eroded by the overlapping patents (Hunt, 2004) . Another reason is dynamic 27 Solving completely the model with examiner's eort is feasible, but it would not add to our understanding of the forces at work here. competition: as more patents are granted, the duration of monopoly for a current patent holder is smaller, so the value associated with obtaining a patent is lower (Hunt, 2004). 28
In this subsection, we analyze the situation where the number of patents granted has a negative impact on the value of patent protection.
Let v(x) denote the expected value of obtaining a patent when x patents are granted, and assume it decreases with the total number of patents: v (x) < 0. There is now a force counteracting the fact that congestion increases the probability of obtaining a patent and therefore induces rms to apply for patent protection: the larger the number of expected patents delivered, the lower the value of obtaining a patent, and therefore, the lower the incentives to apply for patent protection. We will assume that xv(x) is increasing in x, so that the congestion eect remains dominant.
A complete analysis would be tedious. So, we focus on emphasizing the robustness of our ndings and illustrating new interesting phenomena. Moreover, we mostly limit our investigation to the following case: h(n) = n, so that congestion eects are easily tractable. In this special case, Propositions 1, 2 and 3 indicate that for some policy instruments, there exists a (pure strategy) high-R&D equilibrium, and it is separating (D S = ∅); yet, there also always exists a no-R&D equilibrium (D 0 = R 2 + ) so that the high-R&D separating equilibrium is never the unique equilibrium (D * S = ∅); nally, there never exists a high-R&D pooling equilibrium (D P = ∅).
The following proposition should be contrasted with these results.
Proposition 5. Consider the model in which the value of patent protection depends on the number of granted patents and h(n) = n:
• there exists a no-R&D equilibrium with no patent applications if and only if f + a(σ * ) ≥ v(0); there exists a no-R&D equilibrium with all rms applying for patent protection if and only if f ≤ v(1); therefore, there exists a no-R&D equilibrium except in the domain
• there never exists a high-R&D pooling equilibrium;
28 Hunt (2004) studies a model with sequential innovation, where a patent is replaced by the next generation's innovation, and the patent holder's prot is driven to zero. A stronger patentability reduces the probability that the next generation's innovation will be patentable, so it prolongs the expected duration of monopoly of a patent holder.
• there exists a non-empty domain
} in which there exists a high-R&D separating equilibrium; then, R&D eort π S (f, σ * ) uniquely solves: π = φ(v(π − σ * ) − f ), and it is decreasing in f and increasing in σ * ;
• within the domain D * *
, the unique equilibrium is the separating high-R&D equilibrium with π S (f, σ * );
• for some values of the policy instruments, e.g. within the domain {(σ * , f ) ∈ R 2
, the equilibrium involves strictly mixed strategies in R&D activity, i.e. rms randomize between R&D eort π S (f, σ * ) and 0.
The negative impact of the number of patents granted on the value of patents induces a counter-active force on the congestion phenomenon. This translates into the fact that it is possible to design policy instruments so that there is some R&D activity in the unique equilibrium.
As a new result, R&D eort may be random in some other range of the parameters, with some rms ending up exerting R&D eort and others no exerting R&D eort at all. Yet, the domain D 1 , in which there exists no no-R&D equilibrium, is rather limited: in the neighborhood of the model of section 2, i.e. when v(x) = v + εw(x) with ε small, D 1 shrinks as ε goes to 0.
As expected, a stricter standard of non-obviousness and a lower submission fee lead to more R&D in the separating equilibrium. However, the maximum σ * and the minimum f such that the separating equilibrium exists are such that there exists an equilibrium with no R&D, as in the basic model. Therefore, there is still a trade-o between the level of innovative activity and the number of applications in equilibrium.
Finally it is also interesting to mention the possibility of high-R&D pooling equilibria in the model with a general congestion function h(.). Then, R&D eort is the unique solution of:
so that π P is increasing in the non-obviousness standard σ * . As in Proposition 1, the submission still has a negative impact on the R&D eort in the separating equilibrium and has no impact on the R&D eort in the pooling equilibrium; but now, both π S and π P increase with the non-obviousness standard σ * . Echoing Corollary 3, it is still the case that when separating and pooling high-R&D equilibria co-exist, R&D is higher in the separating equilibrium.
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The dierence between rms' expected prot in the pooling equilibrium and rms' expected prots in the separating equilibrium is not unambiguously positive, however; it is a decreasing function of the submission fee f , but it is negative for values of f close to h(1)v(x P ). 30
Innovativeness aects the value of patent protection
The model so far makes the restrictive assumption that the value of patent protection does not depend on the degree of inventiveness θ of the innovation. One may argue that more innovative innovations, if protected, generate higher marketing prots, so that v should be an increasing function of θ. It is not entirely convincing, though, as more inventive innovations do not necessarily meet more protable demands and, at the same time, a standard technology (low θ) that is patented may induce full monopolization of a protable market segment and therefore may generate high prots. So, there is a weak case for considering that the value of patent protection is increasing in innovativeness and we show that our model predictions are qualitatively robust to this extension. 
πP , a contradiction. Therefore, πS > πP . 30 The dierence between the ex ante prots in the pooling and in the separating is:
Given that
as shown in the appendix, the derivative of this dierence with respect to f is equal to:
The pooling exists only if f ≤ h(1)v(xP ) and for this value, the dierence equals:
, which means that the dierence is negative for f = h(1)v(xP ).
arguments for a steep v(.) function. To simplify the analysis, let us moreover assume that congestion takes the extreme form: h(n) = n, as in the previous subsection.
Although the complete analysis is tedious, the following proposition shows that the main conclusions of the basic model (with h(n) = n) are robust to this modeling change.
Proposition 6. Consider the model in which innovativeness aects the value of patents and h(n) = n; then, as in the basic model,
• there exists a no-R&D equilibrium for all values of the policy instruments (f, σ * );
• for some values of the policy instruments (f, σ * ), there exists high-R&D equilibria;
• in all equilibria with non-trivial R&D, R&D eort is given byπ(f), that uniquely solves
some obvious projects refrain from applying for patent protection, but there may be bad patents in equilibrium.
Policy instruments cannot avoid the existence of no-R&D equilibria. When well designed, the policy instruments can lead to the existence of high-R&D equilibria as well, in which R&D eort is a decreasing function of the application fee and in which at least some poorly innovative projects refrain from applying for a patent: such an equilibrium generalizes the high-R&D separating equilibrium of the basic model.
Conclusion
This paper has proposed a model of the IP protection system, in particular of the patent issuance process. We formalized the overload problem within Patent Oces, echoing the well-documented evidence of a worldwide congestion. In a basically static model focusing on a simple representation of the current patent system, we analyzed the consequences on R&D activity and on the rms' strategies when applying for patent protection. Our conclusions point toward the possibility of a systemic malfunctioning as a result of opportunistic patent applications in an overload situation. Consequently, more bad patents are being issued, with the possibility of multiple equilibria. These problems cannot be resolved by standard control instruments only.
Our model obviously suers from several limitations. First, R&D is a continuous and often cumulative process, with patent applications landing in the Patent Oce's mailbox relentlessly.
The Oce's policy may evolve over time, and the examination process may become more or less ecient according to the knowledge accumulated in previous patents; in the long run, it is also likely that reputation will play a more prominent role than the mere commitment to some given criteria.
Second, the Oce's actual toolkit is more complex and more sophisticated than formalized here. Patent applications are examined sequentially, in the order in which they entered the Oce, and the Oce can adjust the processing speed or prioritize applications. Following up on an idea introduced by Lichtman and Lemley (2007) which was recently carried on by the Obama administration, 31 the USPTO is thinking about oering a menu of procedures, i.e. a two-tiered patent system, that would allow applicants to pay a higher fee for tighter Patent Oce scrutiny, resulting in a "gold-plated" patent. Such a screening process would give patents the benet of a stronger presumption of validity in court, which would make it more valuable.
32 Overall, it would be interesting to address the issue of the optimal design for the IP protection system, taking into account the possibility of congestion.
Third, the IP protection system relies not just on the ex ante control performed by Patent
Oces, but also on ex post invalidation procedures arbitrated by courts. A few economic contributions have started to devise a theoretical framework for this dual regulatory institution (Chiou, 2008) , and it would be interesting to investigate how the overload problem that we analyzed would be aected in a wider context. The main eect on our settings would be to make the value of patent protection endogenous, as it would then depend on the competitors' incentives to contest the patent, based on their beliefs about the average quality of patents.
Finally, the Patent Oce itself could be viewed as an Agent acting on behalf of Congress, but with its own agenda. The Oce has a number of examiners on its payroll, and their incentives should also be more precisely formalized. An overall approach in terms of optimal regulation within an agency framework could then be developed.
These limitations, along with other fascinating issues, provide material for future research.
31 See http : //www.barackobama.com/pdf /issues/technology/F act_sheet_innovation_and_technology.pdf 32 In a recent paper, Atal and Bar (2009) formalize this idea and study its impact on the volume and quality of patent applications and grants.
Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1
In a separating equilibrium, the application strategy is a best response for rms only if h(π * − σ * )v ≤ f ≤ v. The expected prots of a rm choosing its R&D are then given by: 33
V ( 
Conversely, under these conditions, the posited strategy consisting in π * = φ(v − f ) and in application for protection whenever θ ≥ σ * obviously sustains an equilibrium.
In a mixed equilibrium, rms θ < σ * must be indierent between applying for protection or not, i.e. h(π * − σ * + m * − )v = f . Apart from this, the analysis of expected prots and of the equilibrium R&D is similar to the previous case. So, a mixed equilibrium exists if and only if
Note that several type of mixed equilibria may exist: to achieve m * − , it can be that either all rms θ < σ * randomize (applying with probability
), or that rms apply above a threshold θ * (with θ * = σ * − m * − ), or any combination.
In a pooling equilibrium, all rms apply for protection so that h(1)v ≥ f necessarily holds.
The expected prots of a rm choosing its R&D are given by:
A positive maximum arises at
this condition, such a pooling equilibrium trivially exists.
Finally, from Lemma 1, it is immediate that A σ
Proof of Proposition 2
On such an equilibrium path, (almost) all rms end up with θ < σ * . If rms do not expect to get strictly valuable protection with positive probability, the expected prot function when 33 We use the notation: x + = sup{0, x}.
a rm chooses its R&D is strictly decreasing for π ∈ [0, σ * ]. Therefore, it is necessary that in equilibrium a positive mass applies for protection and that h(1)v > f . But then, v > f and rms would also apply if they turned out to get θ > σ * . The expected prots function is therefore:
whose maximum can only be equal to 0 or to π P = φ((1 − h(1))v) > σ * .
Proof of Proposition 3
All rms apply for a patent (m * − = 1) only if h(1)v ≥ f ; the expected prot of a rm choosing its R&D ex ante is given by (3). If the rm makes no R&D eort (π = 0),
Therefore, an equilibrium with zero R&D and all rms applying for patent protection exists only
These conditions are obviously sucient.
No rm applies for a patent (m * 
Proof of Corollary 3
Firms' expected prot is V S = A σ * (v −f ) in the separating equilibrium, V P = A σ * (v(1−h(1))+ vh(1) − f in the high R&D pooling equilibrium and V 0 = vh(1) − f in the no-R&D equilibrium where all rms apply. A necessary condition for multiple equilibria to arise is f ≤ vh(1). First,
; when the no-R&D equilibrium exists with application by all projects, a(σ * ≥ v(1 − h(1)) and so, V 0 − V S is positive for f = vh(1). Therefore, when the separating equilibrium co-exists with the no-R&D equilibrium,
is also a decreasing function of f , and is null when f = vh(1). Therefore, when the separating equilibrium co-exists with the high R&D pooling equilibrium, V P ≥ V S .
Moreover, the R&D eort is higher in the separating equilibrium than in the pooling equi-
Proof of Proposition 5
In a separating equilibrium with high R&D π S , there are π S − σ * applications and x S = π S − σ * patents are granted. The rms' R&D eort at the equilibrium is determined implicitly by:
Note that the equation:
is such that the left-hand side is larger than the right-hand side when π S goes to 1, while it is
This proves the existence of (π S , x S ). Uniqueness follows from the fact that the right-hand side is decreasing in π S . Total dierentiation then gives:
hence the variations of π S . As in the basic analysis, a separating equilibrium exists if and only if
Note that there also exist mixed strategy (in applications) equilibria within this range. The non-existence of pooling equilibria follows from the same analysis as in the basic model.
In an equilibrium where rms make no R&D eort and all apply for a patent, x = 1 patents are granted. Such an equilibrium exists only only if v(1) ≥ f and this condition is obviously sucient. In an equilibrium with no-R&D and no rms applying for patent protection, 0 patents are granted, so this equilibrium exists only if 0 ≤ f and A σ * (v(0) − f ) ≤ 0, which are also sucient conditions. The characterization of D 1 and D * * S follows straightforwardly.
Finally, let us consider the domain {(
From our analysis, no equilibrium with pure strategies in R&D eort exists. Consider the following system:
for the same reasons as above, there exists a unique solution (π * , x * ) as a function of (α, f, σ * ).
Let us then examine the equation:
When α goes to 0, x * goes to 0 and the left-hand side is larger than the right-hand side; when α goes to 1, x * goes to x S and, from the assumption, the left-hand side is smaller than the right-hand side. Hence there exists α * that solves the equation.
Consider now the following strategies for rms: randomize R&D eort by choosing π * (α * , f, σ * ) with probability α * and 0 with probability 1 − α * ; then, apply for patent protection whenever θ > σ * and refrain otherwise. Firms expect α * (π * − σ * ) applications that will all be accepted.
Their application strategy is an equilibrium strategy because v(1) ≤ f ≤ v(x * ) and since by assumption v(1) ≥ x * v(x * ), this implies: x * v(x * ) ≤ f ≤ v(x * ). Moreover, rms' expected prots ex ante have two maxima: one at π = 0 and one at π * ; hence, randomization is a best response for rms. It follows that the postulated strategies sustain an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 6
Suppose that v(0) ≥ f and consider the following strategies: no rm exerts R&D eort and rms always apply for patent protection, whatever their project. Since v(0) ≥ f , for any θ, v(θ) ≥ f . Given that all rms apply, a rm with project θ therefore applies for protection as a best response. The expected prots of a particular rm investing π in R&D equals:
which is decreasing in π. 34 Therefore, all rms choose π = 0. The proposed strategies therefore sustain an equilibrium.
Suppose instead that f > v(0) and letθ(f ) ≡ inf{v −1 (f ), 1} > 0. Consider the following strategies: no R&D eort and patent application for θ ≥ sup{σ * ,θ(f )}. If all rms follow these strategies, there is no application in equilibrium (since all projects are non-novel) and therefore a rm applies if and only if v(θ) ≥ f and θ ≥ σ * . The expected prots of a particular rm investing π ≥ sup{σ * ,θ(f )} in R&D equals:
The derivative in π equals v(π) − v(0) − γ (π); it is decreasing in π and non-positive for π = 0.
and they are equal to −γ(π) otherwise. The derivative of this expected prot function for π ≥ sup{σ * ,θ(f )} is equal to v(π) − γ (π) − f ; since it is decreasing in π, v(π) − γ (π) − f ≤ v(0) − f − γ (0) < 0. So, the best R&D choice for a rm is π = 0.
Therefore, whatever (f, σ * ), there exists a no-R&D equilibrium, which proves the rst part of the proposition.
It is immediate to prove that there cannot exist low-R&D equilibria in this setting either.
There cannot exist a high-R&D equilibrium where all rms apply, i.e. a full pooling equilibrium, irrespective of their innovativeness, since all would have probability 1 of being patented (h(1) = 1) and therefore none would have any incentives to invest in R&D. Provided it exists, a non-zero-R&D equilibrium is therefore characterized by π * > σ * and by θ * , the critical value of innovativeness such that rms in equilibrium apply if and only if θ ≥ θ * (a immediate version of Lemma 2 applies). Dierent cases must be investigated depending on the relative position of θ * and σ * .
There cannot exist a high-R&D equilibrium such that σ * < θ * ≤ π * . it is decreasing and negative for π = θ * since v(θ * ) = f . A rm would then invest π = 0, a contradiction.
Suppose an equilibrium exists such that 0 < θ * ≤ σ * < π * . Then, patent application for θ ≥ θ * is a best response only if (π * − σ * )v(θ * ) ≤ f ≤ v(σ * ) and, if θ * < σ * , it must be that (π * − θ * )v(θ * ) = f . The expected prots of a rm investing π are given by −γ(π) for π < θ * , if π ≥ σ * . On the range (θ * , σ * ), if indeed θ * < σ * , the derivative of this expression equals (π * − σ * )v(π) − f − γ (π). As v(.) − γ (.) is decreasing, (π * − σ * )v(π) − f − γ (π) ≤ (π * − σ * )v(θ * ) − f − γ (θ * ) = −γ (θ * ) < 0. Expected prots are therefore decreasing within this range.
For π > σ * , the derivative equals v(π) − f − γ (π). For such a high-R&D equilibrium to exist, it is necessary that v(σ * ) − f − γ (σ * ) > 0. Then, there exists a uniqueπ(f ) (continuity and monotonicity of v − γ ), such that:
v(π) − f − γ (π) = 0.
It must then be that:
The necessary conditions found out are sucient for strategies with R&D eortπ(f ) to constitute an equilibrium.
It follows that the set of necessary and sucient conditions for the existence of a high-R&D equilibrium with θ * = σ * are: (π(f ) − σ * )v(σ * ) ≤ f < v(σ * ) − γ (σ * ) and (π(v(0) )v(0), v(0)). Then, there exists ε > 0 such that for σ * < ε, the double inequality holds. Moreover, for σ * = 0, the integral condition writes down as:
holding as a strict inequality. Therefore, there exists an open neighborhood of {(f, σ * ),π(v(0))v(0) < f < v(0), σ * = 0} in which there exists a high-R&D equilibrium with θ * = σ * . Note that such high R&D equilibrium is the only equilibrium for which there are only good patents, i.e. only projects with θ ≥ σ * get patent protection.
For the sake of completeness, there may also exist high-R&D equilibria with 0 < θ * < σ * < π * and high-R&D equilibria with θ * = 0, in which case rms with no innovation randomize and apply with probability m. In this latter case, we know that m < 1, as there cannot exists a high-R&D equilibrium in which all rms apply (see above). And in these equilibria, there are projects with θ ∈ (θ * , σ * ) that get patented, i.e. there are bad patents.
